Trust and legal

Everything your procurement team will ask for, before they ask for it.

I am one person, so the paperwork is where the rigour shows. Below is how I handle personal data, every processor that touches it, the contract I work under, and the clauses I will not sign. Read it now instead of during week three of onboarding.

Deliverables
Handed over into your tenant or repository
Breach notice
Within 24 hours of becoming aware
Sub-processor change
30 days’ notice, right to object
Liability cap
Up to £25,000 generally; at least £100,000 for data and confidentiality
For the buyer

What actually happens to your data

Six things, in the order a security reviewer asks them.

Deliverables end up in your tenant

Final deliverables and decision logs are handed over into your Microsoft 365 or Google tenant, under your retention rules. While the work is in progress, drafts and meeting notes sit only with the providers named in the register below. Anything sent by email is moved to your tenant within five business days and deleted from my mailbox.

Your code lives where we agree

Either in your repository, deployed to your infrastructure under accounts you issue, or on my self-hosted GitLab server in Portsmouth, UK, and my hosting in Karlsruhe, Germany, which is covered by the UK’s adequacy regulation. Which of the two applies is settled before work starts, and the controls for my servers are listed below.

AI tools run on terms that exclude training

Only paid, API or enterprise tiers. No use of your inputs for model training, retention set to the minimum the provider offers, and zero data retention enabled where it is available. I send extracts rather than complete records wherever the task allows, and no output reaches you without my review.

One person has access

Access control is not a policy here, it is a fact of the business. The work device is encrypted, every account has a unique password and a second factor, and there is no support team, no offshore subcontractor and no shared drive.

A breach reaches you within 24 hours

From the moment I become aware, not from the moment it happened. Where a hosting provider is the source of the incident I also run independent monitoring on both servers, because a provider’s contractual notice period is not a channel you can rely on.

And where I cannot promise something

Complete UK residency of all processing is not achievable with the AI tooling this work requires, and I will not write a clause that says otherwise. What I can show is control: named providers, named locations, named transfer mechanisms, and your deliverables in your own tenant.

Technical and organisational measures

The controls, as a checklist

The article 32 measures in force today, written as controls rather than as assurances. Grouped by what they apply to: how I work on your project is a different system from this website, and each control is stated only for the one it is true of.

Working on your project

How client work is done: the device, the accounts, access to your systems, environments, change control and the end of the engagement.

Encrypted, locked and patched work device
Client work is done on a laptop with full-disk encryption (FileVault). The screen locks automatically after a short idle period, and the operating system and browser install security updates automatically.
Unique credentials and second factors
Every account has a unique, generated password held in a password manager. Every service that supports a second factor has one enabled. Accounts are per-person and never shared.
Separate environments
Client projects run in separate local, staging and production environments. A change reaches production only after it has been through staging. Production credentials are held in the production environment and the password manager, and are never committed to a repository.
Change control and audit trail
Every change goes through a merge request, and CI runs linting and the test suite before it can be merged. Deployments run from that history, so the state of production is reproducible and every change has an attributable author and timestamp. Where your team has engineers, they can review and approve merge requests; otherwise the review is mine, and I do not present it as independent.
Access issued by you, returned at the end
Where the work runs on your infrastructure, I use named accounts that you issue and can revoke at any time. At the end of the engagement every access you issued is returned or revoked, local copies and working drafts are deleted, and the deletion is confirmed to you in writing.

Servers I operate

The self-hosted GitLab server and the application hosting. They run this website, and the client projects whose code or deployments are hosted with me rather than on your own infrastructure.

TLS 1.3 in transit
TLS 1.3 negotiated on every public endpoint, with AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 and forward secrecy. TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are refused at the handshake, so the floor is 1.2. Every application endpoint answers plain HTTP with a 301 to HTTPS. HSTS with a two-year max-age is served on this site and on the GitLab server.
SSH transport
The SSH daemon is restricted to modern cipher suites with forward secrecy and Ed25519 host keys. Legacy and weak algorithms (including 3DES, RC4, CBC-mode ciphers and legacy Diffie-Hellman groups) are refused at the handshake.
Key-only server access
Both servers accept public key authentication only. Password authentication is disabled at the daemon, so there is no password to guess, phish or reuse.
Monitoring
Uptime and error monitoring on both servers, independent of the hosting provider, so an incident is detected by me rather than reported by a supplier on its own timetable.

This website and invoicing

chyshkala.com itself: the public pages, enquiry forms, the invoice and payment flow, and its administration interface. None of this touches client project data.

Passkey administration
The administration interface uses passkeys (WebAuthn), so there is no password to replay. Administrative credentials are stored as salted, slow one-way hashes, never in plain text. Session tokens are signed JWTs, expire on a fixed schedule, and are verified on every administrative request.
Brute-force protection
Strict database-backed rate-limiting and temporary lockout per IP address on administrative authentication, persisting across process restarts. Public endpoints that accept input carry dedicated rate limits and body size caps.
Content Security Policy and browser hardening
An allow-list Content Security Policy is enforced at the reverse proxy: no eval, no plugins, no framing by other sites, and base-uri and form targets locked down; violations are reported to error monitoring. Inline scripts are permitted, because the pages are statically pre-rendered and a nonce-based policy would require rendering every request. X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, HSTS and a referrer policy are served on every response, and the server does not advertise its software or version. Session cookies are Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite.
Secure defaults in the application
Honeypot fields on public forms, HTML escaping before any user text reaches an email or a chat message, and signature verification on inbound Stripe webhooks. Card details are entered on Stripe and never reach this server.
Quality gate on every deploy
Linting runs on every commit through a pre-commit hook. Every deploy is then gated in CI on a clean install from the lockfile, linting, type checking and the full test suite; a failure blocks the release.
Dependency and vulnerability management
Dependency versions are locked by a committed lockfile. Every deploy is gated by an automated audit of production dependencies: a high- or critical-severity advisory blocks the release until it is patched. The rare exception, where no patched release exists and the flaw is not reachable, is recorded with its reason and an expiry date, and blocks the release again when it expires.
Email authentication
Outbound mail is authenticated via SPF and cryptographically signed with DKIM for the sending domain, with a published DMARC policy, so messages claiming to be from chyshkala.com can be independently verified by receiving servers.

Not in place, and not claimed

Listed so that a reviewer does not have to discover them by asking.

  • Dedicated corporate VPN / network-level IP allow-listing for server infrastructure administration. (Currently enforced at the daemon and host level via public-key authentication, WebAuthn passkeys, and rate-limiting).
  • A documented restore test for the database backups. Backups run, but the restore is performed ad hoc rather than on a schedule against a written procedure.
  • Independent penetration test of the public site and the invoice interface, scheduled rather than completed.
  • Formal ISO 27001 certification. Not held, not claimed, and not planned for the current year.

Found a vulnerability? Email ihor@chyshkala.com. The same contact is published in security.txt.

For the security reviewer

The sub-processor register

Two separate registers, because these are two different processing operations and conflating them is how most vendor registers go wrong.

Register 1 — client engagements

I am the processor, you are the controller

This is Annex 1 to Schedule 4 of the master agreement. It carries a general written authorisation, 30 days’ notice of any change, and a right to object on data protection grounds. Notice of a change is sent by email to the contact named in your agreement, with the updated Annex 1. Providers marked as available are listed so they can be switched on for UK-region processing without a fresh notice period — they are not in use today.

Your own systems: Final deliverables and decision logs are handed over into your own Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant, or your repository, under your retention rules. Your tenant is your own infrastructure as controller, not a sub-processor.

  • Google Workspace
    Google Cloud EMEA Limited
    Purpose
    Email, calendar and meetings. Mailbox copies are deleted within five business days
    Location
    EU (Ireland), US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework (EU SCCs as fallback)
  • Google Cloud (Gemini, Vertex AI)
    Google Cloud EMEA Limited
    Purpose
    Drafting and review. Paid tier only; no training on inputs
    Location
    EU, US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework (EU SCCs as fallback)
  • OpenAI
    OpenAI OpCo, LLC
    Purpose
    Drafting and summarising
    Data handling
    No training on inputs. Retained only for abuse monitoring
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • IC Studio Traders Ltd
    IC Studio Traders Ltd (company no. 15249470; Ihor is a director)
    Purpose
    Holds the Anthropic account through which I use Claude. Article 28 agreement passes on the obligations of the DPA; its other personnel have no access to client data
    Location
    UK
    Transfer
    No transfer outside the UK
  • Anthropic
    Anthropic Ireland, Limited (engaged by IC Studio Traders Ltd)
    Purpose
    Drafting and review
    Data handling
    No training on inputs
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    UK adequacy regulation for the EEA (contracting entity in Ireland); EU SCCs with the UK Addendum where required
  • OpenRouter
    OpenRouter, Inc.
    Purpose
    Model routing. European endpoint, Google models excluded for client data
    Data handling
    Zero Data Retention (ZDR) enabled; no training on inputs
    Location
    EU (European endpoint), US
    Transfer
    UK Addendum to the EU SCCs
  • Notion
    Notion Labs, Inc.
    Purpose
    Meeting notes, discovery logs, deliverable drafts
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • GitHub
    GitHub, Inc. (Microsoft)
    Purpose
    Repository access for technical review
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework; EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • Contabo — self-hosted GitLab
    Contabo GmbH (server operated by Contabo UK Ltd)
    Purpose
    Source code repositories, merge requests and CI pipelines for client projects
    Location
    UK (Portsmouth)
    Transfer
    No transfer outside the UK
  • Contabo — application hosting
    Contabo GmbH (data centre operated by TelemaX Telekommunikation GmbH)
    Purpose
    Staging and production environments, with their databases, for client applications I host
    Location
    Germany (Karlsruhe)
    Transfer
    UK adequacy for the EEA: no transfer instrument needed
  • Xero
    Xero (UK) Limited
    Purpose
    Invoices, expenses and financial records
    Location
    UK
    Transfer
    No transfer outside the UK
  • Azure OpenAI
    Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited
    Not active
    Purpose
    UK-region inference, available if you require it
    Location
    UK South, EU
    Transfer
    None where processing stays in UK South; otherwise EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • Amazon Bedrock
    Amazon Web Services EMEA SARL
    Not active
    Purpose
    Claude in the London region, available if you require it
    Location
    UK (London), EU, US
    Transfer
    None where processing stays in London; otherwise EU SCCs with the UK Addendum

Register 2 — this website

I am the controller

A materially different list, for a different role. The master agreement’s Schedule 4 does not cover this processing, and should not be read as though it does.

  • Contabo GmbH
    Contabo GmbH
    Purpose
    Application hosting and database for this website. The GitLab server is separately in the UK
    Location
    Karlsruhe, Germany — UK adequacy applies
    Transfer
    Adequacy: no transfer instrument needed
  • Contabo — self-hosted Mattermost
    Contabo GmbH
    Purpose
    Internal notifications to me: new enquiries, bookings and payment events. Runs on a server I operate
    Location
    Germany — UK adequacy applies
    Transfer
    Adequacy: no transfer instrument needed
  • Stripe
    Stripe Payments Europe, Limited (Stripe Payments UK Ltd as additional party)
    Purpose
    Card payments and checkout. Card details never reach this server
    Location
    EU (Ireland), US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework; EU SCCs with the UK Addendum as fallback
  • Google Analytics 4
    Google Ireland Limited
    Purpose
    Consent-gated usage analytics. Consent Mode v2 defaults to denied
    Location
    EU, US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework (EU SCCs as fallback)
  • Gmail SMTP
    Google Cloud EMEA Limited
    Purpose
    Transactional email: enquiries, invoices, bookings, newsletter
    Location
    EU (Ireland), US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework (EU SCCs as fallback)
  • Sanity
    Sanity US Inc.
    Purpose
    Blog and case-study content. Editor accounts only; no visitor data
    Location
    US, EU
    Transfer
    EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • OpenAI
    OpenAI OpCo, LLC
    Purpose
    Content embeddings for search, and article narration
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • IC Studio Traders Ltd
    IC Studio Traders Ltd (company no. 15249470; Ihor is a director)
    Purpose
    Holds the Anthropic account used by the chat assistant and tools, as my processor under a written Article 28 agreement
    Location
    UK
    Transfer
    No transfer outside the UK
  • Anthropic
    Anthropic Ireland, Limited (engaged by IC Studio Traders Ltd)
    Purpose
    Chat assistant and interactive tools inference
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    UK adequacy regulation for the EEA (contracting entity in Ireland); EU SCCs with the UK Addendum where required
  • Pinecone
    Pinecone Systems, Inc.
    Purpose
    Vector index used to retrieve published content for the assistant
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • Sentry
    Functional Software, Inc.
    Purpose
    Error monitoring in production only
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework; EU SCCs with the UK Addendum
  • ElevenLabs
    ElevenLabs Inc.
    Purpose
    Text-to-speech narration of published articles
    Location
    US
    Transfer
    UK extension to the EU–US Data Privacy Framework; EU SCCs with the UK Addendum

Provider-level evidence — the accepted DPA, the date of acceptance and the saved copy — is kept on file and available on request. A link to a provider’s current terms is not evidence, because providers revise them without notice.

For procurement & legal redlines

What I will and won’t sign

Commercial boundaries stated clearly in advance to save both sides weeks of redlining.

Signing my paper needs no negotiation. The master agreement and statement of work are published below in full. If they work for you, they can be signed as issued. The boundaries below are for legal teams who arrive with their own vendor contract.

Happy to sign

  • Your NDA. Mutual or one-way, whichever your legal team prefers.
  • Your master agreement, with the exceptions listed opposite.
  • Your security questionnaire, and your vendor onboarding pack.
  • A statement of work with acceptance criteria you wrote.

Will not sign

  • An uncapped indemnity. Liability is capped at the lower of six months’ fees or £25,000, and separately at the higher of £100,000 or 24 months’ fees for confidentiality and data protection — which is the number that matters if the thing you are worried about is a data incident, not a late deliverable.
  • A guarantee of procurement outcomes, vendor performance or savings.
  • A promise of complete UK residency of all processing. It is not achievable with the AI tools this work needs, and I will not write a clause I cannot evidence.
  • A joint-controller arrangement, without a written analysis first.

If you have your own paper, use it. I will work under your master agreement and your NDA. I keep three things through the redlines: the liability cap tied to fees, the disclosure of conflicts and commissions, and the position that the appointment decision is yours and the advice is mine. Everything else is negotiable.

For the lawyer

The documents

Published in full, as printable PDFs. No form, no gate, no sales call first. The rate card is the only thing redacted, and the copy says so where it happens.

Engagement

Data Processing Agreement

The Article 28 terms that apply when I process personal data on your behalf, with the authorised sub-processor list annexed.

It is the document your DPO will ask for. Ask for it on day one and read it before the second procurement review, not after.

v2.516 November 20265 pages

Identical to Schedule 4 of the master agreement, so the two cannot drift.

Master Services Agreement

The framework contract: scope, fees, intellectual property, liability, conflicts of interest, confidentiality and data protection.

Each piece of work is commissioned by a signed statement of work under this agreement. Nothing is provided on a handshake.

v2.516 November 202626 pages

Schedule 2 (rates) is redacted: rates are quoted per statement of work.

Mutual Non-Disclosure Agreement

A symmetric confidentiality agreement, three-year term for ordinary confidential information and indefinite for identified trade secrets.

Sign it before the conversation gets specific. Mutual, non-exclusive, with a permitted-disclosure carve-out for vendors in a procurement exercise.

v2.225 October 202611 pages

Terms of service

The terms that attach to work bought through an invoice: scope, payment, warranty, intellectual property and the liability cap.

This is the contract for small pieces of work bought without a full master agreement. Its liability cap is the same as the master agreement, so the two cannot contradict each other.

v2026.1022 October 2026

This website

Privacy notice

How this website handles personal data as a controller: enquiries, bookings, invoices, the newsletter and analytics.

This is the notice that covers the website. It is deliberately separate from the DPA, which only covers client work.

v2026.1027 October 2026

Website terms of use

The rules for using this site, and the intellectual property position on its content.

Standard, and short. It does not govern paid work.

v2025.123 December 2025

Need one of them in another form?

The PDFs above are the published versions and you do not need to ask for those. Use this if you need an editable copy to redline, or a version from before the current one. Sent to your work address, usually the same working day.

I work with companies only. These copies are released to organisations, not to individuals, so please use your corporate mailbox — name@yourcompany.com. Gmail, Outlook, Yahoo and other personal or disposable addresses are not accepted.

Documents
What do you need

Personal mailboxes are not accepted.

The legal or trading name of the organisation you are requesting on behalf of.

Your name and email are used to send the documents and nothing else. They are not added to a mailing list. See the privacy notice.

Who you are contracting with

All engagements contracted directly through this site are with Ihor Chyshkala as a sole trader.

Ihor Chyshkala

Sole trader, England and Wales

All engagements contracted directly through this site are with Ihor Chyshkala as a sole trader.

Address for notices
13 Charlton Avenue, Eccles, Greater Manchester, M30 0JQ, United Kingdom
Governing law
England and Wales
Professional indemnity
£2,000,000 per claim (committed by MSA clause 15.3, certificate available on request)
Public liability
£2,000,000 per claim for on-site SOWs (MSA clause 15.4)
ICO registration
In progress under the Data Protection Act 2018 (Information Commissioner’s Office)

Document control

Last reviewed
16 November 2026
Review cycle
Quarterly
Register version
2026.11
Notice of changes
30 days

These documents are commercial templates, not legal advice, and reading this page does not create a contract or an engagement. Work is commissioned only by a signed statement of work under a signed master agreement.

Ask a question about any of this